Sacrificing Our TODAY for the World's TOMORROW
FATA is "Federally Administered Tribal Area" of Pakistan; consisting of 7 Agencies and 6 F.Rs; with a 27000 Sq Km area and 4.5 m population.
MYTH: FATA is the HUB of militancy, terrorism and unrest in Afghanistan.
REALITY: FATA is the worst "VICTIM of Militancy”. Thousands of Civilians dead & injured; Hundreds of Schools destroyed; Thousands of homes raised to ground; 40% population displaced from homes.
Showing posts with label PKSecurity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PKSecurity. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Brigadier Ali Khan: Terrorist or Hero; An Analysis - فوج میں امریکہ مخالف جذبات کے نمائندے

بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام :Courtesy

فوج میں امریکہ مخالف جذبات کے نمائندے

کالعدم تنظیم حزب التحریر کے ساتھ مبینہ تعلقات پر زیرحراست پاکستانی فوج کے بریگیڈیئر علی خان، ان کے بعض ساتھیوں اور سینئر افسران کے مطابق، گزشتہ کئی سالوں میں پاکستانی فوج میں امریکہ مخالف جذبات کے نمائندے کے طور پر سامنے آئے تھے۔
انیس سو اٹھاون میں میانوالی کے ایک گاؤں کے غریب خاندان کے صوبیدار مہر خان کے گھر پیدا ہونے والے علی خان نے انیس سو اناسی میں پاکستانی فوج میں کمیشن حاصل کیا۔
کلِک ’گرفتاری انتقامی کارروائی ہے‘
وہ اپنے گولڈ میڈل اور شاندار سروس ریکارڈ کے باعث پاکستانی فوج کے ’بہترین‘ افسران میں شمار ہوتے تھے۔ اپنے ریکارڈ کے مطابق وہ تقرریوں اور ترقیوں کی دوڑ میں نمایاں حیثیت میں کامیابی کی منازل طے کرتے رہے یہاں تک کہ امریکہ کے ورلڈ ٹریڈ سینٹر پر دہشت گرد حملے ہوئے اور پاکستانی فوج نے امریکہ کو افغانستان میں فوجی کارروائی کے لیے فوجی تعاون فراہم کرنا شروع کر دیا۔
بریگیڈیئر علی خان اس وقت کمانڈ اینڈ سٹاف کالج میں کورس میں شامل تھے جس کے بعد ان کی میجر جنرل کے عہدے پر ترقی تقریباً یقینی تھی۔ بری فوج کے سربراہ جنرل پرویز مشرف کوئٹہ پہنچے اور سٹاف کالج سے خطاب کیا۔ سوال و جواب کی نشست شروع ہوئی۔ بریگیڈئر علی خان نے مائیک سنبھالا اور تقریر نما سوال داغ دیا۔

Saturday, May 28, 2011

WE are PAKISTAN - and - WE are NOT Terrorists... Sacrificing Our TODAY for the World's TOMORROW

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Pakistan: Women Lose Livelihood Centres to Curse of Militancy (IPS News, 28 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Inter Press Service (IPS)", 28 May 2011
Women Lose Livelihood Centres to Militants
By Ashfaq Yusufzai
PESHAWAR - Housewife Shahida Jabeen was devastated when she heard the news that she could no longer take sewing and embroidery classes at the local training centre in her hometown in South Waziristan in north-west Pakistan.
"It was like a bombshell when I was told that the skill development centre had been closed," Jabeen told IPS over the phone.
Like Jabeen, Wajiha Begum lamented the closure of her training centre. "My mother trained in the centre and she is now very good at embroidery. I wanted to fill my mother’s shoes but militancy has snatched from us the opportunity to learn skills. First they destroyed schools and now the skill development," Begum said.

Monday, May 23, 2011

Pakistan: Attack on Naval Base PNS Mehran in Karachi - کراچی:نیول بیس پر شدت پسندوں کا حملہ، طیارہ تباہ، عمارت پر قبضہ

 بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام :Courtesy

کراچی:نیول بیس پر شدت پسندوں کا حملہ، طیارہ تباہ، عمارت پر قبضہ

ریاض سہیل، حسن کاظمی کراچی
کراچی میں پاکستان بحریہ کے بیس پی این ایس مہران پر ایک درجن سے زیادہ شدت پسندوں نےحملہ کیا ہے۔ نیوی اہلکاروں کے مطابق حملہ آوروں نے میری ٹائم نگرانی کرنے والے طیارے پی تھری اورین کو تباہ کر دیا اور کئی ہیلی کاپٹروں کو بھی نقصان پہنچایا ہے۔
سکیورٹی فورسز کے اہلکار پی نیوی بیس میں داخل ہو چکے ہیں اور شدت پسندوں کے ساتھ مقابلہ جاری ہے۔ عینی شاہدوں کے مطابق نیول بیس سے وقفے وقفے سےگولیاں چلنے اور دھماکوں کی آوازیں سنی جا رہی ہیں۔

TTP Militants storm Pakistan's PNS Mehran naval aviation base in Karachi (Reuters, 23 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Reuters", 23 May 2011
Gunmen storm Pakistan's naval aviation base

By Faisal Aziz 
KARACHI
(Reuters) - A group of militants were holed up inside Pakistan's naval aviation base on Monday, six hours after they stormed the installation with guns and grenades, killing at least five people and blowing up a military aircraft.
Nine explosions were reported from the PNS Mehran base in the southern city of Karachi after the late-night assault by up to 15 gunmen, who targeted three hangars housing aircraft.
"They were carrying guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and hand grenades. They hit the aircraft with an RPG," said Navy spokesman Commander Salman Ali. "They are still inside the base."

Sunday, May 22, 2011

Why the Nuclear Program (for Pakistan)? - By Wusatullah Khan - کس کے لیے ؟

 بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام :Courtesy

کس کے لیے ؟

پاکستان جن غیر یقینی حالات میں وجود میں آیا ان سے اسٹیبلشمنٹ نے اور کوئی سبق لیا یا نہ لیا ہو یہ ضرور سیکھا کہ زندہ رہنے کے لیے کم ازکم عسکری لحاظ سے ناقابلِ تسخیر ہونا اشد ضروری ہے۔ چاہے کالے چور سے ہی کیوں نہ مدد لینی پڑ جائے۔

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

CIA flew stealth drones into Pakistan to monitor bin Laden house (Washington Post, 18 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Washington Post", 18 May 2011
CIA flew stealth drones into Pakistan to monitor bin Laden house
By Greg Miller
 The CIA employed sophisticated new stealth drone aircraft to fly dozens of secret missions deep into Pakistani airspace and monitor the compound where Osama bin Laden was killed, current and former U.S. officials said.
Using unmanned planes designed to evade radar detection and operate at high altitudes, the agency conducted clandestine flights over the compound for months before the May 2 assault in an effort to capture high-resolution video that satellites could not provide.
The aircraft allowed the CIA to glide undetected beyond the boundaries that Pakistan has long imposed on other U.S. drones, including the Predators and Reapers that routinely carry out strikes against militants near the border with Afghanistan.

The agency turned to the new stealth aircraft “because they needed to see more about what was going on” than other surveillance platforms allowed, said a former U.S. official familiar with the details of the operation. “It’s not like you can just park a Predator overhead — the Pakistanis would know,” added the former official, who, like others interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the program.
The monitoring effort also involved satellites, eavesdropping equipment and CIA operatives based at a safe house in Abbottabad, the city where bin Laden was found. The agency declined to comment for this article.
The CIA’s repeated secret incursions into Pakistan’s airspace underscore the level of distrust between the United States and a country often described as a key counterterrorism ally, and one that has received billions of dollars in U.S. aid.
Pakistan’s spy chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, last week offered to resign over the government’s failures to detect or prevent a U.S. operation that he described as a “breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty.” The country’s military and main intelligence service have come under harsh criticism since the revelation that bin Laden had been living in a garrison city — in the midst of the nation’s military elite — possibly for years.
The new drones represent a major advance in the capabilities of remotely piloted planes, which have been the signature American weapon against terrorist groups since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
In 2009, the Air Force acknowledged the existence of a stealth drone, a Lockheed Martin model known as the RQ-170 Sentinel, two years after it was spotted at an airfield in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The aircraft bears the distinct, bat-winged shape of larger stealth warplanes. The operational use of the drones has never been described by official sources.
The extensive aerial surveillance after the compound was identified in August helps explain why the CIA went to Congress late last year, seeking permission to transfer tens of millions of dollars within agency budgets to fund intelligence-gathering efforts focused on the complex.
The stealth drones were used on the night of the raid, providing imagery that President Obama and members of his national security team appear in photographs to have been watching as U.S. Navy SEALs descended on the compound shortly after 1 a.m. in Pakistan. The drones are also equipped to eavesdrop on electronic transmissions, enabling U.S. officials to monitor the Pakistani response.

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Note: The viewpoint expressed in this article is solely that of the writer / news outlet. "FATA Awareness Initiative" Team may not agree with the opinion presented.
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We Hope You find the info useful. Keep visiting this blog and remember to leave your feedback / comments / suggestions / requests / corrections.
With Regards,
"FATA Awareness Initiative" Team.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Without "HEADS Rolled" over 'Abbotabad Fiasco', Pakistani public’s resentment ain’t going anywhere (Express Tribune)

Courtesy: Daily "Express Tribune, Pakistan", 18 May 2011
This affair ain’t going anywhere
By Aamer Ahmed Khan
In all mature democracies, it is the elected government that takes state institutions into confidence and not, the other way around. But let us not be sidetracked by this obvious anomaly, when trying to understand what came out of the military’s briefing of the parliamentarians over the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, in Abbottabad.
Pakistan’s information minister told the media, after the briefing, that the parliament was aware of the tough times that the military was facing and had agreed that the nation should stand united behind its armed forces. In subsequent reports, we also heard that the chief of the ISI had told parliamentarians that, immediately, after Osama bin Laden’s killing in Abbottabad, he had accepted responsibility for the intelligence failure and offered his resignation to the army chief — which was rejected.
Interestingly, the army chief had said shortly before the briefing that the government’s failure to come up with an unambiguous explanation of the events of May 2, had led to misgivings and resentment within the public. The briefing, as such, was part of the efforts to defuse the resentment. The obvious question then is: Has the combined civil and military leadership been able to do that?

Despite the ever present Pakistani wrath against the Americans, there cannot be too many Pakistanis who seriously believe that the US can be punished by Pakistan for violating its territorial integrity. However, the fact that the question of public anger remains unresolved is clear evidence of the nation’s desire to see someone punished for the failure that has made Pakistan, and its powerful army, the butt of jokes the world over.
What seems to be puzzling millions of Pakistanis, is the inexplicable difficulty in affixing responsibility. If everyone accepts that it was an intelligence failure, and the ISI chief has accepted responsibility, then what is it that prevents the person responsible from being punished?
We are told that Osama bin Laden was in Abbottabad for about five years. That takes us to back to the current army chief’s tenure as the head of the ISI. That’s two people who have never said they are not responsible for the failure. Add the air chief, whose radars remained blank and who couldn’t scramble his jets in time, and we have the entire lot.
It is therefore understandably difficult for Pakistanis to accept how holding these three people responsible, amounts to abandoning the armed forces in their hour of need. The military is an institution that operates way above individuals. In fact, its integrity requires that individuals not up to safeguarding it, should not be asked to do so. And not being vigilant on this front is tantamount to abandoning the entire institution.
What is it, then, that makes it so difficult for an elected government to do the needful? And if public resentment over the manner in which the world’s most wanted man was hunted refuses to die down, is it because of what the Americans did on May 2, or because of what their own leadership has continued to do since?
For the outside world, it may be more important to know if Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad was Pakistan’s intelligence failure or wilful deception. But for Pakistanis, the more urgent question may centre upon the primacy of individuals over institutions. It may make political sense for the government to go easy on our current military leadership to ensure that the apple cart stays upright, but does it make institutional sense?
Pakistan’s civil and military leaders can come up with a million explanations but unless this question is answered honestly, the public’s resentment ain’t going anywhere.
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Note: The viewpoint expressed in this article is solely that of the writer / news outlet. "FATA Awareness Initiative" Team may not agree with the opinion presented.
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We Hope You find the info useful. Keep visiting this blog and remember to leave your feedback / comments / suggestions / requests / corrections.
With Regards,
"FATA Awareness Initiative" Team.

2 Pak Soldiers wounded in NATO helicopters attack on Pakistan Military border post (Washington Post, 17 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Washington Post", 17 May 2011
Pakistan: NATO helicopters hit border post 
By Karin Brulliard
ISLAMABAD — NATO helicopters crossed from Afghanistan into Pakistan and fired on a Pakistani border post early Tuesday, injuring two paramilitary soldiers, according to the Pakistani army.
Soldiers at the post in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan fired on the helicopters, which prompted an exchange of fire, the military said in a statement. North Waziristan, in Pakistan’s tribal belt, is home to several militant organizations that target international forces across the border in Afghanistan. Though Pakistan secretly allows CIA drones to strike the area, it does not permit any form of NATO troop operations on its territory, and a helicopter strike could heighten the fierce tensions between the United States and Pakistan.
Representatives for the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan said they had been notified about the alleged incursion but could not yet confirm it, news services reported. Other Pakistani officials in North Waziristan said they were also investigating.

Pakistan: Police foil Female suicide bombers attack on Quetta checkpost (Express Tribune, 17 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Express Tribune, Pakistan", 17 May 2011
Female suicide bombers attack Quetta checkpost
QUETTA: A woman blew herself up at a security checkpost near Kharotabad area of Quetta on Tuesday as police tried to arrest the armed suspects approaching the checkpost.
Five suspects, including three women and two children, were approaching the checkpost in the residential area when the security forces discovered they had explosive materials. The forces tried to stop them when one person blew herself up to avoid arrest, reported Arzoo Rehman for Express 24/7.
One woman was of 20-25 years of age while another one was 15-20 years old, said initial reports. The Frontier Corps (FC) said all the attackers, including three women and two men, were foreigners with either Chechen or Uzbek origin and have been killed by the FC Police. The women were reportedly equipped with hand grenades.
Police officials also recovered several hand grenades as well as Russian and Iranian passports from the site.

Monday, May 16, 2011

Saudi diplomat killed in Pakistan (Aljazeera English, 16 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Aljazeera English", 16 May 2011
Saudi diplomat killed in Pakistan
Gunmen on motorcycle opened fire on official's vehicle in southern port city of Karachi, then fled.
Gunmen have shot and killed a Saudi diplomat in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, as he was driving to his country's consulate, police and Saudi embassy staff say.
Hassan al-Khatani, a diplomat who worked at the Saudi consulate, was shot dead by two gunmen who were riding a motorcyle early on Monday morning, Pakistani police officials said.
"Two gunmen riding on a motorcycle showered the car with bullets," Zameer Husain Abbasi, a police official, said, adding that a 9mm pistol had been used in the attack.
Police say al-Khatani was alone in the vehicle - a silver Toyota Corona - at the time of the attack, which took place about one kilometre from the Saudi consulate. They said he was driving to work from his residence, located nearby.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

Carnage in Shabqadar; Tale of Twin Suicide Attacks on 13 May 2011 - شبقدر میں قتلِ عام

 بی بی سی اردو ڈاٹ کام :Courtesy

شبقدر میں قتلِ عام

طالبان نے کہا ہے کہ پاکستان کے شمال مغربی شہر شبقدر میں نیم فوجی دستے کی اکیڈمی کے باہر حملہ انہوں نے کیا ہے جس میں کم از کم اسی افراد ہلاک ہو گئے ہیں۔ بی بی سی فارسی ٹی وی کے ہارون نجفی زادہ دھماکے کی جگہ سے اس قتلِ عام کے متعلق بتاتے ہیں۔

’ہم دھماکے کے تین گھنٹے بعد یہاں پہنچے اور ہم نے انتہائی افرادتفری کا منظر دیکھا۔ یہاں ایسا منظر ہے جو کہ حالیہ برسوں میں پاکستان بھر میں دکھائی دیا ہے لیکن پھر بھی اس سے ہونے والے انتہائی صدمے میں کمی نہیں آتی۔

Suicide Bombers kill 80 in Pakistan's North-West (Associated Press, 13 May 2011)

Courtesy: “Associated Press (AP)”, 13 May 2011
Suicide Bombers kill 80 in Pakistan's North-West
SHABQADAR, Pakistan (AP) -- A pair of Taliban suicide bombers attacked paramilitary police recruits eagerly heading home for a break after months of training, killing 80 people Friday in the first act of retaliation for the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden.
In claiming responsibility, the al-Qaida linked militant group cited anger at Pakistan's military for failing to stop the American incursion on their soil.
The blasts in the northwest were a reminder of the savagery of Islamist insurgents in Pakistan. Tensions also have risen between the U.S. and Islamabad over allegations that some elements of Pakistani security forces had been harboring bin Laden, who died in a May 2 raid in Abbottabad, a garrison town about three hours' drive from the scene of the bombing.

Pakistani Taliban TTP show resolve to fight on after bin Laden (Associated Press, 13 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Associated Press", 13 May 2011
Taliban show resolve to fight on after bin Laden

ISLAMABAD (AP) -- A double Taliban suicide attack that killed 66 paramilitary police recruits represented the deadliest terrorist strike in Pakistan since the killing of Osama bin Laden. It sent a strong signal that militants mean to fight on and to try to avenge the al-Qaida leader.
Friday's attack came as both the Pakistani and Afghan wings of the Taliban have been carrying out attacks to prove they remain a potent force and bolster their profiles in case peace talks prevail in Afghanistan.
U.S. and Afghan officials have said they hope the Afghan Taliban will use bin Laden's death as an opportunity to break their link with al-Qaida - an alliance the U.S. says must be severed if the insurgents want peace in Afghanistan. But Afghan officials and Pakistani experts say any severing of ties would not happen anytime soon, if at all.

Thursday, May 12, 2011

Visas for Americans (including undercover CIA sleuths) create rifts in Pakistan (Reuters, 12 May 2011)

Courtesy: "Reuters", 12 May 2011
"Reuters" Exclusive: Visas for Americans create rifts in Pakistan
By Michael Georgy
ISLAMABAD
(Reuters) - Pakistan's civilian government issued visas to more than 400 Americans without army security clearances starting in early 2010, possibly enabling the CIA to boost its presence, in a move that angered the powerful military.
Details of the visa decision emerged after U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in his compound in the garrison town of Abbottabad on May 2, straining already uneasy ties between strategic allies Islamabad and Washington.
The granting of the visas has also fueled tension between the military and the unstable nuclear-armed country's civilian leaders, whose relations are uneasy at the best of times.
Pakistani cooperation is crucial for U.S. efforts to combat Islamist militants and bring stability to Afghanistan.
However, the United States has had doubts about Islamabad's commitment and, given the contacts that Pakistan's spy agency has had with Islamist militants in the past, almost certainly uses its own operatives to collect intelligence in the country.
Pakistani diplomatic missions in Washington, the United Arab Emirates and London issued the visas after the government came under intense pressure from the United States, officials said.
"At the end of 2009, a special presidential order was issued to give 7,000 visas and the same order was passed through the prime minister's office to Mr. Haqqani," a senior Pakistani security official told Reuters, referring to Pakistan's ambassador in the United States, Husain Haqqani.
"On the basis of these orders, the visas which were valid for three to six months were issued without the scrutiny or routine security clearance of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence)."
The ISI is the military's main spy agency.
About 450 of those visas were issued to the CIA, the security official said.
A spokeswoman for President Asif Ali Zardari declined to comment on details of the visa decision, saying only that security clearance was not always needed from the army.
The army did not respond to a request for information on the visas, but a senior security official said "We lost control of CIA operatives in Pakistan."
Army generals, who have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its history, largely direct security and foreign policy even when civilian administrations are in power, as is the case now, and they do not like to be challenged on those agendas.
MILITARY "HOPPING MAD"
Ties between the United States and Pakistan reached a low point this year after Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor and former U.S. special forces member, shot dead two Pakistanis in the city of Lahore in January.
Davis, who said he acted in self defense, was freed in March after "blood money" -- compensation to the families of those killed -- was paid.
Ayesha Siddiqa, author of "Military Inc," a book on the military's economic might, said it was clear why army chief Ashfaq Kayani and the head of the ISI were "hopping mad" over the Davis case.
"Because somebody in the Pakistani political government had allowed X number of CIA operatives to come into Pakistan and set up parallel operations to sneak into what was going on," she told Reuters.
A second security official said the military was angered by the move and as a result the number of Americans in the country that had received the visas has been reduced by 50 percent. But those who remained were cause for concern.
"This will affect the already tense relations between the two countries. This indicates the lack of trust and mutual understanding, which will ultimately benefit the militants and extremist elements inside Pakistan," he said.
"They (the security establishment) lost track of most of the people who came in. Their missions were not clearly stated."
A former Interior Ministry official said it had been bypassed as well when the visas were issued. Haqqani said the issue had been blown out of proportion.
"Also, the 7000 figure is incorrect & official records prove hype on subject is totally fabricated. All procedures followed," he said on his Twitter page on May 8.
The U.S. embassy declined comment on suggestions the visas may have enabled the CIA to expand its presence in Pakistan, which receives billions of dollars in U.S. military aid.
"We submit full and complete visa applications to the government of Pakistan. We comply in providing the information requested," said an embassy spokeswoman.
U.S. officials have complained in the past about hundreds of Pakistani visa delays, saying this could hamper aid intended to stabilize the Islamabad government and help Pakistan's people.
Islamabad has cut by more than half a visa backlog affecting U.S. officials and contractors needed to run American aid programs aimed at combating extremism there, a State Department official said in March of last year.
Former Finance Ministry advisor Sakib Sherani said U.S. officials made visa requests for people needed to audit requests made under a Coalition Support Fund that was established after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States to reimburse Pakistan for help in fighting militancy.
That account was confirmed by the second senior security official.
"We resisted and said 'you don't need 450 (to audit the fund requests)'. Then they said they needed other technical people," said Sherani, who said he took part in some of the discussions.
An intelligence official in Lahore said Pakistani authorities began to get suspicious after they noticed a large number of people who appeared to be Americans driving bullet-proof sports utility vehicles.


(Additional reporting by Kamran Haider, John Chalmers, Chris Allbritton and Mark Hosenball in Washington; Editing by Robert Birsel
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Note: The viewpoint expressed in this article is solely that of the writer / news outlet. "FATA Awareness Initiative" Team may not agree with the opinion presented.
....................

We Hope You find the info useful. Keep visiting this blog and remember to leave your feedback / comments / suggestions / requests / corrections.
With Regards,
"FATA Awareness Initiative" Team.

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Bangladesh 1971 War Myths Busted by New Research - By Sarmila Bose (Aljazeera English)

Courtesy: "Aljazeera English", 9 May 2011
Myth-busting the Bangladesh war of 1971
An author discusses her new book about the historical narratives of the 1971 civil war that broke up East Pakistan.
Guerilla fighters of the Mukti Bahini prepare to bayonet men who allegedly collaborated with the Pakistani army during East Pakistan's fight to become the independent state of Bangladesh [GALLO/GETTY]
Last month, Al Jazeera published an article entitled Book, film greeted with fury among Bengalis. Here, Sarmila Bose, author of Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, responds to the criticism levelled at her work.In all the excitement about the "Arab spring" it is instructive to remember the 1971 war in South Asia. Then too there was a military regime in Pakistan, easily identified as the "baddies" -  and a popular uprising in its rebellious Eastern province, where Bengali nationalists were reported to be peacefully seeking freedom, democracy and human rights.

When the regime used military force to crush the rebellion in East Pakistan, India intervened like a knight to the rescue, resulting in the defeat of the bad guys, victory for the good guys and the independence of Bangladesh... Or so the story went for forty years. I grew up with it in Calcutta. It was widely repeated in the international press.
Several years ago I decided to chronicle a number of incidents of the 1971 war in-depth. I observed that many Bangladeshis were aggrieved that the world seemed to have forgotten the terrible trauma of the birth of their nation. Given the scale of the suffering, that lack of memory certainly appeared to be unfair, but there did not seem to be many detailed studies of the war - without which the world could not be expected to remember, or understand, what had happened in 1971.
My aim was to record as much as possible of what seemed to be a much-commented-on but poorly documented conflict - and to humanise it, so that the war could be depicted in terms of the people who were caught up in it, and not just faceless statistics. I hoped that the detailed documentation of what happened at the human level on the ground would help to shed some light on the conflict as a whole.
The principal tool of my study was memories. I read all available memoirs and reminiscences, in both English and Bengali. But I also embarked on extensive fieldwork, finding and talking to people who were present at many particular incidents, whether as participants, victims or eye-witnesses. Crucially, I wanted to hear the stories from multiple sources, including people on different sides of the war, so as to get as balanced and well-rounded a reconstruction as possible.
As soon as I started to do systematic research on the 1971 war, I found that there was a problem with the story which I had grown up believing: from the evidence that emanated from the memories of all sides at the ground level, significant parts of the "dominant narrative" seem not to have been true. Many "facts" had been exaggerated, fabricated, distorted or concealed. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public. I had thought I would be chronicling the details of the story of 1971 with which I had been brought up, but I found instead that there was a different story to be told.
Product of research
My book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the product of several years of fieldwork based research, has just been published (Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press). It focuses on the bitter fratricidal war within the province of East Pakistan over a period of a little more than a year, rather than the open "hot" war between India and Pakistan towards the end. It brings together, for the first time, the memories of dozens of people from each side of the conflict who were present in East Pakistan during the war. It lets the available evidence tell the stories. It has been described as a work that "will set anew the terms of debate" about this war.
Even before anyone has had the chance to read it, Dead Reckoning has been attracting comment, some of it of a nature that according to an observer would make the very reception of my book a subject of "taboo studies". "Myth-busting" works that undermine nationalist mythology, especially those that have gone unchallenged for several decades, are clearly not to be undertaken by the faint-hearted. The book has received gratifying praise from scholars and journalists who read the advance copies, but the word "courageous" cropped up with ominous frequency in many of the reviews. Some scholars praised my work in private; others told me to prepare for the flak that was bound to follow. One "myth-busting" scholar was glad my book was out at last, as I would now sweep up at the unpopularity stakes and she would get some respite after enduring several years of abuse.
Scholars and investigative journalists have an important role in "busting" politically partisan narratives. And yet, far too often we all fall for the seductive appeal of a simplistic "good versus evil" story, or fail to challenge victors' histories.
So far the story of valiant rebels fighting oppressive dictators in the so-called "Arab spring" has had one significant blemish - the vicious sexual attack and attempted murder of CBS foreign correspondent Lara Logan by dozens of men celebrating the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square in Cairo. It initially vanished from the headlines and has still not led to the kind of questioning of the representation of such conflicts that it should have generated. "Tahrir Square" became shorthand for freedom and democracy-loving people rising up against oppressive dictators.
People in other countries started to say they wanted their own "Tahrir Square". Logan has given a brave and graphic account of what happened to her at the hands of those supposedly celebrating the fall of a dictator and the coming of freedom, democracy and human rights. Her life was saved by burqa-clad Egyptian women and she was rescued by soldiers. Her account endows "Tahrir Square" with an entirely different meaning.
It should caution us against assuming that all those opposing an oppressive regime are champions of non-violence, democracy or human rights. It should alert us to the complexities of political power struggles and civil war, and stop getting carried away by what we imagine is happening, or would like to happen, rather than what the evidence supports.
Such was the impact of the 1971 war on South Asians that the year has transformed into a shorthand for its particular symbolism: 1971, or ekattor, the number 71 in Bengali, has come to stand for a simple equation of a popular nationalist uprising presumed to embody liberal democratic values battling brutal repression by a military dictatorship. But was it really as simple as that? Over time, the victorious Bangladeshi nationalist side's narrative of Pakistani villainy and Bengali victimhood became entrenched through unquestioned repetition.
The losing side of Pakistani nationalists had its own myth-making, comprising vast Indian plots. Pakistan had been carved out of the British Empire in India as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. It was a problematic idea from the start - a large proportion of Muslims chose to remain in secular and pluralistic India, for instance, and its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of a hostile India. In 1971 the idea of Islam as the basis of nationhood came apart in South Asia along with the country of Pakistan, after a mere 23 years of existence. What went wrong? And what do the memories of those who were there reveal about the reality of that war?
The publication of Dead Reckoning has spoiled the day for those who had been peddling their respective nationalist mythologies undisturbed for so long. Careers have been built - in politics, media, academia and development - on a particular telling of the 1971 war. All the warring parties of 1971 remain relentlessly partisan in recounting the conflict. As the dominant narrative, which has gained currency around the world, is that of the victorious Bangladeshi nationalists and their Indian allies, they stand to lose the most in any unbiased appraisal. Unsurprisingly therefore, the protests from this section are the shrillest.
Mixed reaction
The reaction to the publication of Dead Reckoning by those who feel threatened by it has followed a predictable path. First, there has been an attempt to damn the book before it was even available. Apart from random rants on the internet - which provides opportunity for anyone to rail against anything - reports have been written by people who haven't read the book, citing other people who also haven't read the book. The reason for this may be summed up as the well-founded fear of "knowledge is power".
When people read the book they will be far better informed as to what really happened in 1971. Hence the desperate attempt by those who have been spinning their particular yarns for so long to try to smear the book before anyone gets the chance to read it. A few people also seem to be trying to laud the book before reading it, an equally meaningless exercise. These commentaries are easy to dismiss: clearly, those who haven't read the book have nothing of value to say about it.
Second, detractors of the book claim that it exonerates the military from atrocities committed in East Pakistan in 1971. In reality the book details over several chapters many cases of atrocities committed by the regime's forces, so anyone who says it excuses the military's brutalities is clearly lying. The question is - why are they lying about something that will easily be found out as soon as people start reading the book? The answer to this question is more complex than it might seem. Of course the detractors hope that by making such claims they will stop people from reading the book.
Part of the answer lies also in that the book corrects some of the absurd exaggerations about the army's actions with which Bangladeshi nationalists had happily embellished their stories of "villainous" Pakistanis for all these years. But an important reason for falsely claiming that the book exonerates the military is to distract attention from the fact that it also chronicles the brutalities by their own side, committed in the name of Bengali nationalism. The nature and scale of atrocities committed by the "nationalist" side had been edited out of the dominant narrative. Its discovery spoils the "villains versus innocents" spin of Bangladeshi nationalist mythology.
A key question about the "controversy" over Dead Reckoning is why this book is stirring such passions when other works do not. One reason for this is that there are precious few studies of the 1971 war based on dispassionate research. This is the first book-length study that reconstructs the violence of the war at the ground-level, utilising multiple memories from all sides of the conflict.
Two eminent US historians, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, published the only research-based study of the war at the diplomatic and policy level twenty years ago. Their excellent book, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, 1990), challenged the dominant narrative, but their work does not seem to be known among the general public as much as within academia.
However, a crucial reason for the special impact of Dead Reckoning has to do with who the author is. I am a Bengali, from a nationalist family in India. As Indians and Bengalis our sympathies had been firmly with the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971. The dominant narrative of the 1971 war is the story as told by "my side", as it were. My reporting of what I actually found through my research, rather than unquestioningly repeating the partisan narrative or continuing the conspiracy of silence over uncomfortable truths, is thus taken as a "betrayal" by those who have profited for so long from mythologising the history of 1971.
It is important to note that not all South Asians subscribe to the myth-making. One eminent Indian journalist thought that my "courage, disregard for orthodoxy and meticulous research" in writing Dead Reckoning made me "the enfant terrible of Indian historians". A senior Bangladeshi scholar has found it "fitting that someone with Sarmila's links with Bengali nationalism should demonstrate that political values cannot be furthered by distorting history."
South Asians are prone to conjuring up all manner of conspiracy theories when faced with unpleasant realities, but those looking for one for Dead Reckoning are at a loss, as the only explanation for what it contains is that it reconstructs what really happened on the basis of available evidence.
The process of dismantling entrenched nationalist mythologies can be painful for those who have much vested in them, but the passions stirred by the publication of Dead Reckoning has sparked the debate that the 1971 war badly needed - and set on the right course the discussion of this bitter and brutal fratricidal war that split the only homeland created for Muslims in the modern world.

Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Fellow in the Politics of South Asia at the University of Oxford. She was a journalist in India for many years. She earned her degrees at Bryn Mawr College (History) and Harvard University (MPA and PhD in Political Economy and Government.)

Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War is published by C. Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press.
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Pen and Paper Jihad: Pakistan's Effort to Resocialize Former Swat Taliban (Spiegel International)

Courtesy: "Spiegel Interanational", 11 May 2011
Pen and Paper Jihad: Pakistan's Effort to Resocialize Former Taliban
For two years, the Taliban terrorized the beautiful Swat Valley in northern Pakistan. Now that Islamabad has regained control, it is trying to resocialize those who supported the Islamist radicals. In "deradicalization" courses, they learn how they can be good Muslims without killing non-believers.
By Hasnain Kazim in the Swat Valley, Pakistan
Faiz Ali Khan's hand are shaking as he pulls out his exercise book. The book is full of poems the 40-year-old has composed and he reads one aloud. It is a poem about springtime sunshine and freedom and peace.

Khan is a prisoner, an inmate at a "deradicalization center" for Taliban members in Pakistan's Swat Valley. A man with a graying beard, he wears a Pashtun hat, part of the prisoners' uniform. Khan is not particularly terrifying, striking an unimposing figure, his body slim and weak. His legs hurt, Khan says, and he hasn't done enough walking in recent days. Khan is currently taking part in a computer course, where the inmates are learning to compose a text, then save and print it. It's nothing new for Khan, who worked as a journalist for the local newspaper before he was arrested, and who also holds a degree in law. "He's an educated man," says Major Waqas Akbar, who directs the deradicalization program here in Gulibagh, in the middle of the Swat Valley. The center is called "Rastoon," meaning "Place of the Right Path." There are other centers here in the Swat Valley -- another one for men, one for women and one for adolescents.
"Removing Radical Thoughts"
Several other inmates are hunched in front of computers in the same room, many finding the task more difficult than Khan, although they are considerably younger -- most are between 20 and 30. One man pecks away at the keyboard, using only his index finger, for several minutes. "I love you Hassan" is the end result on his computer screen. The men sitting next to him laugh when they read the sentence.
In the next room over, a sergeant is explaining what an electrical circuit is to a group of men. It's an effort for them to understand him, since their native language is Pashto, while the army uses Urdu.
Together with psychologists, officers here have spent months researching whether and how Taliban helpers and sympathizers could be deradicalized. They looked at programs in Saudi Arabia and in Yemen, learned about the reintegration of right-wing radicals in Denmark and Great Britain and studied how those who helped the Nazis during the Third Reich became democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The result is a three-month deradicalization course that has been up and running for a year. The goal, Waqas says, is to "remove radical thoughts."
"We conduct very intensive one-on-one interviews, a total of six times over the course of 12 weeks, each time for five to six hours," explains Army psychologist Farrukh Akhtar, a diminutive, pleasant-seeming man. Akhtar also tries to find out to what degree the prisoners were perpetrators or victims. Akhtar has just come from a meeting with two men arrested because they'd had contact with a wanted terrorist. One of them even attended a Taliban training camp.
A "Holy War" with Paper and Pen
"What did you do there?" Akhtar asks him. As he talks to the men, he flips through files containing everything the army knows about the prisoners. Akhtar deliberately chooses not to wear a uniform, not wanting to further intimidate the men he questions, who are already distressed.

"They told me I should help build roads, Doctor."
"You didn't know you were supposed to dig trenches?"
"No."
"Is there anything you can tell us that was good about your time in the camp?"
The man considers the question. "Yes, actually, we always had something to eat." An important part of the "de-Talibanization" process is religious instruction. "In any religion, there are various ways to interpret something. We want to set a few things straight there," Major Waqas explains. A "jihad," or "holy war," for example, can also be fought with paper and pen instead of weapons, he says.
More than 50 bearded men sit in a hall, listening to their teacher, a cleric. He is explaining, at length and with arm gestures, what makes a good Muslim.
"A devout Muslim respects his fellow humans," the teacher says.
The men nod.
"A devout Muslim doesn't misuse religion to exercise power."
The men nod again. The cleric speaks to them in Pashto, since it is imperative that they understand him.
art 2: Showcase Project for the Pakistani Army

"Our prisoners here in Gulibagh aren't hardcore terrorists," Major Waqas emphasizes. Khan the poet, for example, was just a hanger-on, a small fish. He was one of the people who allowed himself to be pressured by extremists who came to the valley in the fall of 2007, occupying it and seizing power. These extremists closed girls' schools, music shops and hairdressers' salons, and instituted Sharia law as the only valid legal system. "They went into every single house and demanded obedience," Khan recalls. Anyone who didn't obey was killed. The extremists had little difficulty overcoming the poor, uneducated local population. People in the Swat Valley still show videos on their cell phones of hanged people and bloody executions. "There was nothing else we could do but do what they demanded of us," Khan says in an apologetic tone.
When the army began a military operation in May 2009 to liberate the Swat Valley, once a vacation paradise, over 2 million people fled the violence. Barely half a year later, the region was considered liberated. Many thousands of people in the valley have since been arrested for their connections to the Taliban. "Almost all of them want to participate in the deradicalization program voluntarily, since freedom lies at the other end of it," Major Waqas says. Those who are released receive visits from soldiers every couple of weeks, to check how their resocialization is going.
The deradicalization program is a showcase project offered by an army that feels its fight against terrorism doesn't receive enough recognition internationally. Every Pakistani officer's repertoire includes the statement that Pakistan's armed forces have lost more soldiers in the war against terror since September 11, 2001, than all the Allies in Afghanistan put together.
Three Months of Deradicalization
Still, the army's success here in the Swat Valley has been tarnished by accusations of blatant human rights violations in the region. According to the accounts of some locals, the military acted brutally not only towards terrorists, but also their family members -- women and children -- in many cases killing them and destroying their houses. Videos of soldiers beating up defenseless people turn up regularly. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent organization, has reported extrajudicial executions, illegal arrests, torture and expulsion. Human Rights Watch reported last year that there was "overwhelming evidence" the army had killed more than 200 Taliban sympathizers in the preceding eight months.
The military refutes these accusations. "No army is entirely free of rules violations," says Colonel Tarique Qadir of the army division responsible for the Swat Valley. "But we investigate the people's complaints very seriously and discipline soldiers rigorously when necessary." The word from army headquarters in Rawalpindi is that executions and torture "are not among the instruments we employ in the Swat Valley."
Having just begun his course, Faiz Ali Khan has two and a half months of deradicalization ahead of him. When he is released, he'll only need to walk a few blocks to reach the street where his house stands. Khan hopes he'll be able to work again as a journalist at the local newspaper -- and perhaps even publish his poems from his time in prison.

Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein
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Monday, May 9, 2011

CIA wants ISI Chief Pasha removed - By Ansar Abbasi (The News, 9 May 2011)

Courtesy: Daily "The News", 9 May 2011
CIA increases pressure on Pasha to quit
By Ansar Abbasi
ISLAMABAD: The May 2 Abbottabad fiasco has given an already furious Leon Panetta of CIA a God-gifted opportunity to pin down ISI chief Lt General Shuja Pasha and get him replaced by a “friendly” ISI chief who would tow Washington’s line.
Already the leading American magazine, Newsweek, has demanded of the US administration to insist on the resignation of General Pasha whereas an official source in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington confided to this correspondent that some US authorities have already sounded them about their intentions about Pasha. However, no formal demand has been put forward to Islamabad as yet by Washington to this respect.
To the bad luck of Pasha and the ISI, the Abbottabad fiasco has hit Pakistan at a time when Leon Panetta-led CIA and Gen Pasha-led ISI were already at daggers drawn following Pasha’s insistence to curtail and bring into regular check all CIA operations in Pakistan.
The Newsweek in its latest article “A Faltering Bargain with Pakistan” writes: “As a minimal first step, the U.S. should insist on the resignation of the chief of the ISI, Gen. Shuja Pasha, on the official grounds of a gross failure of his service, and the unofficial grounds that this would be the start of a movement toward greater responsibility and accountability in the service. The U.S. should also insist on more rapid progress in creating an effective counter-terrorism agency to coordinate Pakistan’s feuding intelligence services.”
Washington and the CIA have long been desirous of reducing the ISI as its subsidiary agency and for the same purpose have been pressing Pakistan to “restructure” the agency and to bring it under what the US calls “civilian control”.
A couple of years back, reportedly on foreign pressure, a notification was issued to bring the ISI under Interior Minister Rehman Malik but it was undone immediately following military establishment’s serious objections and the general condemnation of this move by the media, political parties, retired generals, etc. Interestingly, the timing of the notification coincided with the first official visit of Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani to Washington.
In the post-May 2 get-Osama operation by special US forces in Abbottabad, the CIA Chief Leon Panetta came really hard on the ISI despite the latter’s sharing of crucial intelligence information as acknowledged even by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Panetta, however, while commenting about OBL’s whereabouts suggested that Pakistan (ISI) was either accomplice or incompetent. It was the first serious charge levelled by Washington against Pakistan, which though has categorically said that it was the ISI, which provided to the CIA the initial lead that led to the final location of Ladin.
Panetta’s CIA is believed to be in a revengeful mood to teach a lesson to the ISI and Gen Pasha for how they have been treating the CIA in the recent past. Pasha, who was seen by the Americans as “usually emotional”, as reflected by the recent disclosures of WikiLeaks, has been tough with the CIA in recent times. According to the latest media report, the CIA has sought from the ISI the details of all those ISI officials who have been interacting with the al-Qaeda members in the past. In case of Osama also though the ISI provided the lead, the CIA never shared with ISI the information as it later matured.
It is said that Pakistan Army and ISI’s reluctance to expand the military operations against militants beyond the tribal regions of South Waziristan into neighbouring North Waziristan was one of the contributing factors for the deterioration of US-CIA intelligence relationship but the sore point became the ISI’s refusal to dance to the CIA’s tunes.
The relationship between ISI and CIA hit a low point when the CIA was forced to withdraw its local chief in Pakistan late last year after his name was published in the Pakistani media. The CIA blamed ISI for this. Later, the tension grew further between the two after a CIA private contractor Raymond Davis was caught red-handed in a broad daylight cold-blooded murder of two Pakistanis in Lahore. Davis was put behind the bars despite American pressure for his immediate release for being a “diplomat”. Though Davis was later shamelessly released and handed over to the US following a major role reportedly played by the ISI, tensions between the ISI and CIA grew further reportedly after Gen Pasha insisted that all Davis-like CIA agents must wrap up and leave Pakistan.
Media reports though suggested that along with Raymond Davis dozens of undercover CIA operators were also made to pack up, the details of the quid pro quo over Davis’ release were never shared by the government, ISI or the army with the media.
Surprisingly the Raymond Davis’ release instead of improving relations between the CIA and the ISI brought them to all-time low.
After Raymond’s case the ISI reportedly asked CIA to disclose the location of its agents in Pakistan and share with the ISI the nature of their emplacement in Pakistan. After repeated questioning CIA kept denying that they have so many operatives in Pakistan.
In the recent past, spats between the ISI and the CIA got worsened when DG ISI went to USA for talks with the US officials including Panetta. He started with one point agenda that ISI will not support any CIA activity in Afghanistan or Pakistan if the CIA did not declare their operatives in Pakistan.
The ISI is said to have prepared the list of 438 US officials who were in Pakistan but were not part of any consulate or embassy staff in any city. Their whereabouts were asked from CIA, to which they gave the funny reply that many of them have been lost. The CIA, it is said, claimed that these operatives were used in FATA area for the war on terror but in various incidents they have either been kidnapped or killed by Taliban, so now they were no more in Pakistan.
“This stupid reply was totally non-digestible to DG ISI,” a source claimed, adding that in his concluding remarks the DG ISI gave a clear and stern reply to CIA officials that if they don’t know where their operatives were in Pakistan, then ISI was well aware of CIA operatives in the Middle East and we can tell those governments about their presence and activities. Panetta never expected such reply from Pasha.
The two reportedly were embroiled in heated arguments and it all ended up in Pasha returning to Pakistan from Washington within hours of his reaching there. Panetta was furious with Pasha, as he never thought that the intelligence chief of a country like Pakistan would confront the CIA chief this way. So he resolved to pin down Pasha and the ISI.

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Saturday, May 7, 2011

(Drone) Attack (in Waziristan) shows the ‘thumb’ to Pakistan - By Ansar Abbasi (The News, 7 May 2011)

Courtesy: Daily "The News", 7 May 2011
Attack shows the ‘thumb’ to Pakistan
By Ansar AbbasiISLAMABAD: Within 24 hours of the country’s top military brass expressing its resolve to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, US drones again hit Pakistan on Friday in Datta Khel area of North Waziristan and killed at least 10 people. Surprisingly, the attack went unnoticed.
Neither the FO nor the ISPR issued any formal response on behalf of the civilian government and Pakistan military to this latest drone attack. The Friday’s attack by the US followed the May 2 ‘Get-Osama shame’ and the subsequent special meeting of the top military commanders in Rawalpindi held on Thursday to resolve that the defence forces would defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan.


Foreign Office spokesperson Ms Tehmina Janjua, when approached at 8 pm on Friday, said that she was not sure that any statement would be issued by the FO on the latest breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the US drones.
Janjua reiterated the government’s stated policy that the drone attacks are unacceptable and hinted that the FO was in contact with the ISPR to decide whether to issue a formal response or not. Meanwhile, when military sources were approached, they said that the ISPR does not usually issue press releases on drone attacks.
In a press release issued following the corps commanders meeting on Thursday, the Chief of Army Staff, with particular reference to the Abbottabad US operation, was quoted as making it very clear that any similar action, violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, would warrant a review of military intelligence cooperation with the United States. The same day, the Foreign Secretary, Salman Bashir, also reminded the US of the UN conventions that bound every member state to respect the sovereignty of other states.
Instead of respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, the US had the cheeks to launch a new drone attack on the very next day of the top commanders’ meeting in Rawalpindi and within days of its special forces ground attack in Abbottabad that has earned unparalleled shame for Pakistan and its defence and intelligence systems.
In the recent past, there were signs of uneasiness in Islamabad over the Washington’s CIA-controlled drone policy but the Friday’s drone attack went unnoticed both by the Foreign Office and the Pakistan military.
After the shameful departure of Raymond Davis, the United States expressed its gratitude to Islamabad by firing drone missiles the very next day in the same location as the attacks today i.e. in Datta Kheil area of North Waziristan. More than 40 innocents were killed in the attack.
After the long pause of the government ignoring several such attacks, it was the Army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani who condemned the post-Raymond Davis drone attack on a Jirga in North Waziristan. The president, prime minister and even the Foreign Office then followed and issued statements protesting the drone attack.
Later, there have also been demands by different official functionaries here for the halting of the drone attacks to which Washington has never agreed. On Friday, within days of a very serious assault of US special forces on Pakistan territory, Washington again disrespected the sovereignty of the state it calls as its ally in this so-called war on terror.
The military commanders on Thursday indicated of a review of the Pak-US defence cooperation if Washington continued disrespecting the sovereignty of Pakistan.


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Friday, May 6, 2011

Pakistan's Military Seeks to Explain Itself (Time, 6 May 2011)

Courtesy: Weekly "Time, USA", 6 May 2011

Taking Heat on bin Laden, Pakistan's Military Seeks to Explain Itself

Stung by the embarrassment of the discovery and death of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on Monday, Pakistan's powerful military establishment is under pressure to make changes in its relationship with key allies, and in its fight against terrorism.
After three days of sedulous silence on the matter, the military and intelligence leadership on Thursday shared its perspective on the Abbottabad debacle with a select group of senior Pakistani journalists — no foreign news media were invited. The rare closed-door briefing was prompted by a desire to challenge an emerging global narrative that incriminated Pakistan's security establishment in bin-Laden's ability to elude capture, according to some of those present.

General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani reiterated at the briefing that Pakistan had not been informed of the raid until it was over. The first communication from the U.S. was a phone call at around 5 a.m. Pakistan time from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen. Kayani congratulated Mullen on the mission's success, but pleaded that President Barack Obama should refrain from "negative remarks" about Pakistan in his planned address — and was pleased that Obama's live TV announcement avoided criticizing Pakistan.
Kayani's first indication of the raid came earlier, however, with the news of a helicopter crashing and exploding, which was covered by local news media in Abbottabad. The general knew it wasn't a Pakistani helicopter: "We don't fly at night," he told reporters gathered at the military's headquarters in Rawalpindi. Kayani picked up the phone and ordered his airforce to "scramble the jets". Pakistani military analysts say an order to scramble jets is an authorization to shoot down anything in the sky. But by the time two F-16s had reached the scene, the Americans had left.
Kayani responded to Pakistani concerns over how the U.S. helicopters had entered Pakistani airspace undetected by attributing it to technological advantages.
The most damaging accusation against the Pakistani military, of course, is that it must have known bin Laden's was hiding in the small garrison town where army personnel at frequent checkpoints demand identification. "They knew. They knew he was there," wrote Dawn columnist Cyril Almeida, echoing the suspicion of many Pakistanis. Kayani had driven past bin-Laden's bolt-hole literally a week earlier, on his way to tell a gathering at the military academy that the "Pakistan army is fully aware of internal and external threats."
Kayani was adamant that the Pakistanis had no idea that bin-Laden was hiding in Abottabad. "We had no clear, actionable information on Osama bin-Laden," he told the journalists. "If we had it, we would have acted ourselves. No one would have questioned our performance for ten years. It would have raised our international prestige."
Kayani's argument is supported by some senior Western diplomats in Islamabad, who say that there is no conclusive evidence of Pakistani complicity. Nor have Washington's statements alleged complicity, despite suspicions. Diplomats do not rule out the possibility that junior intelligence officers may have been involved, however. Instead of focusing on whether Pakistan was either complicit or incompetent, the explanation may lie in its lack of focus or effort. In recent years, Pakistan has chiefly concentrated on the threat from the Pakistani Taliban, to the neglect of those posed by al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.
The Abbottabad area, Kayani told the briefing, had been of interest to Pakistan's security establishment since at least 2004. There was no suspicion involving the compound, however, and he emphasized that intelligence gathered had been diffuse. Suspicions about Abbottabad were first raised when intercept equipment picked up phone calls in Arabic to Saudi Arabia, concerning finances. That information, Pakistan's military leadership says, was shared with the U.S. At some point, the CIA shutdown its communication with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). "No intelligence agency shares 100% of its intelligence" with another country, said Kayani, himself a former ISI chief. 
Kayani said that in his ISI role, he was responsible for tracking down Faraj al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda member who lived in Abbottabad in 2003 and was arrested the following year in Mardan. Western diplomats and analysts say that Pakistan's success in capturing several al-Qaeda members have been driven by U.S. intelligence. Al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, and Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Baradar, were all seized in joint operations. When it came to bin Laden, however, U.S. officials feared that cooperation could compromise the operation.
While Pakistan's foreign secretary, Salman Bashir, had earlier in the spoken of "strategic convergence" between Islamabad and Washington, Pakistan's intelligence chief chose to be less emollient. Sitting near Kayani, Lieut. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha — recently included in the TIME 100 — said that despite extensive mutual assistance between the CIA and the ISI, Pakistan had made its interests clear to Washington. And, Pasha said he had made clear to Washington that if the U.S. is deemed to be acting against Pakistan's interests, "We'll not help you, we'll resist you."
The consensus among diplomats and analysts is that the bin-Laden debacle will compel Pakistan's military leadership to demonstrate a greater commitment to fighting al-Qaeda. Pakistani leaders have said that they will neither tolerate, nor can they afford, further similar raids, for example to seize al-Qaeda number 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri or Taliban leader Mullah Omar. That said, it is fair to assume that the ISI will seek to avoid that possibility by intensifying their own efforts to find bin Laden's deputy. Yet, at the same time, Pakistan can be expected to assert itself in ways that Washington will not like.
Embarrassment over bin-Laden's presence in Abbottabad notwithstanding, the Pakistani security establishment is angry at what it views as the first U.S. invasion of a nuclear-armed ally. It fears that neighboring India may be smiling at the vulnerability demonstrated by the American raid, and the resulting indignity is hard to swallow. The Army has decided to "reduce the strength of U.S. military personnel in Pakistan to the minimum essential," it said in a statement on Thursday. At the closed-door briefing, Pasha indignantly claimed that his own ISI was on the verge of being "outnumbered" by foreign agents. Still, the bin-Laden episode limits the security establishment's room to maneuver in several ways.
Until now, Pakistan's civilian government has sat silently by watching the military make the key decisions on national security and foreign policy, and even extend their control of certain sectors of the economy. A public long accustomed to muffling its criticism of the army has largely acquiesced. Now, for the first time in several years, many are prepared to openly blame the Army for a humiliation some are comparing to the fall of Dhaka in 1971, when Pakistan lost control of what is now Bangladesh. Suddenly, the civilian government looks more resilient. And the military is not only in trouble with Washington, but also with another key ally, Saudi Arabia, which will not be pleased that its most determined enemy was found in Pakistan. The raid in Abottabad has produced a moment of rare vulnerability in a military establishment that had long been Pakistan's strongest power center.

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